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Institutions and Forest Management: A Case Study from Swat,
Pakistan
Summary
Deforestation in the North western part of Pakistan is a long standing problem. The
Forestry Department, as formal managers of the forest resources, has been undergoing a
long reform process aimed at improving its performance. This reform process has not
resulted in less deforestation. From the policy perspective this has been leading to stated
intentions to further reform the Forestry Department, the question is whether
organizational reform is the answer. We think there are more limiting bottlenecks to
sustainable forest management in Pakistan. De facto property rights are not as simple as
denoted by statutory law. In this article we explore the mechanisms behind the
deforestation and try to uncover mechanisms to reverse the process. Although our
conclusions are not very optimistic, we provide a framework for determining the
bottlenecks in the management of common resources from the perspective of
institutions. We show that in circumstances where institutional change is necessary we
are faced with a trade-off between the transaction costs related to the enforcement of
“improved” institutional arrangements and the transaction costs improving enforceable
institutional arrangements. Incurring these transaction costs only makes sense if the
benefits from improved institutional arrangements outweigh them and the transition
costs. When we relate this dilemma to the management regime of the forest in North
west Pakistan, we identify at the one end of the spectrum the ideal forest management
system; at the other end we see the spontaneous evolution of self organization. The
current situation is an intermediate form with an incoherent set of external interventions
and strategic reactions by different agents in the local communities. The emergent
system of management is the one producing the present dismal outcome.
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1.

Introduction
Deforestation in the North western part of Pakistan is a long standing problem. Forest

cover was 5% in 1996 compared to 20-25% in 1850 (Sungi, 1996). In the district of Swat
where the research was focussed there is a gap (regrowth minus timbercuttings) of over
300 000 m3 for fuel wood alone (Shaheen et al., 2000). Historical accounts tell us that
forests have always been an important source of income within the livelihood strategies
of local population (Barth, 1985; Sultan-i-Rome, 2005). Where in the past the vast
expanses of forests could support these demands, high levels of population growth
(doubling of the population every 15-20 years) coupled by deforestation have drastically
altered the picture. Today, the local population faces ever decreasing forest stocks with
increasing threats to both the local communities (land slides, erosion) and down stream
beneficiaries of the watersheds as well as increasing threat to biodiversity.
In a broader perspective, Angelsen and Wunder (2003) distinguish five dimensions in
which poor people benefit from forests and forest products: the type of beneficiaries,
types of forest products and services provided, the role of forest benefits within the
households strategy (subsistence versus commercial use), type of natural resource
management (ranging from pure natural forest extraction to (re)planted forests, and high
or low return products.
Management of forest resources, especially sustainable management thereof, seems to
be suffering from severe shortcomings. In Pakistan the management of forest resources is
generally considered the exclusive domain of the Forestry Department, especially since
the state is the formal owner of all forest resources. However the actual situation reveals
an amalgam of perceived property rights concerning the forest and its resources, and a
situation where institutions are ill-defined.
Traveling through Swat we see lush green hills and mountains with snow capped
peaks in the distance. The impression is of paradise. On second sight we notice that most
of the lush green areas are not the virgin forests that once covered the hillsides in a not so
distant past. There are only isolated spots of forest left. On the road there is a steady
stream of trucks, pick-up trucks, donkeys and human beings transporting timber and fuel
wood from the forests to the lower, more densely populated areas.
A large land-owner living in the valley indicates that he has attempted to manage the
forested areas of his land holding by devolving the management to a local community
living there and paying them in forestry extraction rights, but to no avail, “the smugglers
are stronger and the local communities are not dependable”. In one such community on
the forest edge an impoverished villager indicates that for them it is cut trees or die.
Forest royalties from official lumber extraction pass them by 60% is for the large
landowners in the valley and 40% for the Forestry Department. Protecting the forest

2
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2008

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 201 [2008]

against local people is feasible but it is impossible to protect the forest from influential
outsiders in collusion with the Forestry Department.
The Forestry Department has the sole mandate for the management of the forests,
which cannot be left to the local population as indicated by senior Forestry Department
officials because they are the root cause of the deforestation. The Forestry Department is
undergoing a reform process including the devolution of control to lower administrative
levels. The problem is that the Forestry Department is under-funded and under-staffed.
Donors have pulled out of the reform process after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
A donor representative on the other hand put forward that lack of real commitment to
the reform process was the reason for the drying up of funds from the donor-community.
NGOs indicate that the people’s perspective is lacking in forest affairs. A lawyer in Swat
adds that the judiciary plays havoc in the process because there are no possibilities of
redress and corruption is rampant.
Devolution is fine, a manager of joint forestry management projects notes, but there
are political fetters: policy and practice are not in line. A Historian adds that social
institutions have eroded since the accession of Swat in the Pakistan state in 1969,
“Finding no legal redress and no redress in social orders leads to illicit use of natural
resources that has become so widespread that it is now the norm.”
The Forestry Department as formal managers of the forest resources has been
undergoing a long reform process aimed at improving its performance. The effects of this
reform process have not resulted in less deforestation. From the policy perspective this
has been leading to stated intentions to further reform the Forestry Department, the
question is whether organizational reform is the answer. We think there are more limiting
bottlenecks to sustainable forest management in Pakistan.
Our research question is therefore to determine the main bottlenecks to halting the
current deforestation trends in North West Pakistan taking an institutional economics
perspective. We believe that such a perspective sheds valuable insights on the
mechanisms of resource degradation and provides a background for evaluating policies
aimed at sustainable forest management.
In this article we explore the mechanisms behind the deforestation and try to uncover
mechanisms to reverse the process. Although our conclusions are not very optimistic, we
provide a framework for determining the bottlenecks in the management of common
resources from the perspective of institutions.
The structure of the article is as follows in section 2 we provide the theoretical
background used in the analysis focusing on property rights, and the historical perspective
and the issue of transaction costs. In section 3 we highlight the results of our analyses.
These analyses are mostly based on qualitative research. The results are related to high
transaction costs, corruption, vested interests and the reform process in the Forest
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Department. Our results paint a very grim picture of the institutional settings surrounding
the management of forest resources. Although the evidence is thin an mostly anecdotal
there is some indication that there are possibilities for sustainable forest management
despite the odds. This evidence is also provided in section 3. In our last section we
provide some conclusions regarding the institutional aspects of forest management.

2.

Methods and analysis
2.1.

New Institutional theory of property rights

In discussions on environmental degradation the issue of property rights plays an
important role. The central thesis is that inappropriate property rights regimes impede
sustainable management of natural resources. A strong message from the seminal paper
“The Tragedy of the Commons” by Hardin (1968) has echoed through the literature. The
message that Common Pool Resources cannot be managed in a sustainable manner lead
the push towards private or state ownership of resources. Actually what Hardin describes
is not Common Property but lack of any property rights regime. This notion has become
common understanding with the publication of seminal papers on this issue (Bromley,
1991; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Von Benda-Beckmann, 2001). Following Von BendaBeckmann (2001) we distinguish between categorical and concretised rights. Categorical
rights are “typified legal concepts that construct a general relationship of rights and
options between categories of persons or groups with respect to categories of resources”
(ibid, p. 299). Examples are constructs such as ownership, inheritance rights. In
concretised rights we are dealing with the rights relationship of actual persons or groups
and a resource.
The rules that define property rights –requiring, prohibiting or permitting certain
actions– are effective when they are generally recognised and respected by the other
economic agents. The rules governing property rights can be divided into operational
level, and collective choice. The former relates to the possibility to access and withdraw
from the resource; the latter relates to the possibility to change management rules,
exclusion rights and alienation rights (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).
We follow up on this discussion with a brief presentation of the idea of bundles of
property rights adding onto this idea the notion of bundles of property duties. The concept
of bundles of property rights has been very clearly addressed by Schlager and Ostrom
(1992). In their paper they distinguish between five types of rights that are bundled in a
property rights regime, namely:
1. Access rights: the right to enter a defined physical property;
2. Withdrawal rights: the right to obtain the “products” of a resource, both in terms of
goods and (environmental) services;
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3. Management rights: the right to regulate the internal pattern of usage and the
transformation of the resource;
4. Exclusion rights: the right to determine who will and who will not have access,
withdrawal and management rights, and how those rights can and cannot be
transferred;
5. Alienation rights: the rights to sell, lease, give-away or bequeath any or all of the
above.
The first two components are the basic operational level rights. The last one is what is
often seen as property rights in a very narrow sense. In the case of common-pool
resources the last three can be considered collective choice property rights. This way of
presenting property rights has proven very powerful to disentangle the complexity of
common property regimes. Applying this theoretical concept to forestry resources
provides us with the following picture in the case of North-West Pakistan.
At the lowest level we have access rights, this means that a person or group is allowed
physical access to a resource. The next right is the right of usufruct, implying the right to
extract certain or all proceeds from the resource. Most forests can be accessed freely, but
the right to withdraw products (timber and non-timber forestry products) is limited by
statutory and customary law. We distinguish management rights from usufruct rights.
Management rights relate to the long-term management of the resource itself not to the
extraction of the proceeds. Often it is impossible to distinguish between the two, since
extraction technology and land management practices are interwoven (even in terms of
semantics). However, there are cases in which a third party has a say in the way the land
is managed. At present the management of forests is the exclusive domain of the Forestry
Department despite efforts over the past decade to devolve some of the management tasks
to local communities. Exclusion rights refer to the possibility of determining who is and
who isn’t allowed access, extraction rights and management rights. According to statutory
law, the forests of Pakistan are State owned, hence exclusion and alienation rights are
officially in the hands of the Forestry Department. As we will argue in the next section
this current state of affairs is quite different from the historical context of forestry
management in North West Pakistan.
In Northern Pakistan two sets of de jure institutions exist next to each other. The first
is statutory law, the second customary law including the customary means of enforcement
as is the case with Pukhtun Society (Barth, 1968) An important aspect of the relationship
between property rights and the way the land resource is utilised is the time horizon of the
property holders. The time horizon depends on the subjective time preference of the rights
holders and on the perception of the duration of the rights at stake. We are now moving
into the characterisation of the rights. The rights besides their content are characterised by
duration and assurance. Duration of rights is the time horizon over which the rights are
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defined. This can be a finite period or an indefinite time-span. The assurance refers to the
perception of how certain it is that the rights holder can ascertain those rights during the
period over which the rights are defined.
These property rights are embedded in institutions. The notion of institutions needs a
little explanation. Since the central concept of this paper is institutions, and especially
economic institutions, it is necessary to provide a clear definition of this concept at this
point. Following North (Ahmed, 1980), we define institutions as the formal rules and
informal constraints guiding human behaviour and the means to ensure adherence to these
rules of the game, in order to reduce uncertainty in the transfer of goods and services
between individuals and/or groups. Formal rules are usually defined as those rules laid
down statutory law, also known as de jure institutions. However if well defined
customary law exists including the customary means of enforcement as is the case with
Pukhtun Society (Barth, 1968 ; Ahmed, 1980) this too should be considered as de jure
institutions.
In Northern Pakistan two sets of de jure institutions exist next to each other. The first is
statutory law, the second customary law. To some extent the rules these two sets of
institutions lay down complement each other, but more often they contradict each other.
In the undefined space created by the competing de jure institutions, de facto property
rights regimes embedded in informal institutions can exist.
Informal de facto institutions also entail culturally accepted norms and modes of
behavior. The institutions themselves shape the process of updating the expectations with
regard to the rules of the game according to actual experience. Hence, the natural
dynamics of institutions is a slow process of gradual adaptation to changing
circumstances. This process follows different speeds. Some institutional arrangements are
deeply embedded in culture and tend to change only very slowly, while other evolve more
quickly.
The common hypothesis is that institutions matter when talking about poverty
reduction and resource conservation (Barrett et al., 2006). If there is uncertainty or lack of
information about property rights and the way they are enforced, this can give rise to
conflicts over those resources that are detrimental for their conservation, (see for instance
Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Haro et al. 2005; Amman and Duraiappah 2004; and
Kabubo-Mariara 2004). The key issue is that it does not really matter which rules are
adopted by a community or country, rather it does matters how well they are embedded
and how well they are enforced (Barret et al., 2006).
Following Williamson (2000) embeddedness refers to the spontaneous, noncalculative
informal institutions anchored in customs, traditions, norms and religion. These
institutions only evolve very slowly. Slightly quicker is the evolution of the formal
institutional environment. These are the formal rules of the game especially related to
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formal property rights and anchored in policy, bureaucracy and the judiciary system.
Whilst the institutional environment tends to remain stable over decades, the play of the
game itself is prone to more rapid change. We are referring to the actual governance
structures that shape the actual marginal conditions. These marginal conditions shape
resource allocation and day-to-day management of common pool resources.
Even when property rights are well defined, enforcement of the property rights may
well entail substantial costs. These costs are part of a larger set of costs commonly known
as transaction costs. The notion that transactions are costly has important theoretical
ramifications. It is a reasonable assumption that individuals or organizations have to use
time and resources to secure information and have limited ability to process data and
formulate appropriate action.
From a theoretical point of view, the fact that decision-makers have neither perfect
knowledge, nor foresight, and may make errors implies that they will always function
inefficiently compared to the hypothetical decision-makers in mainstream neoclassical
economic theory.
A transaction can be defined as something that occurs when a good or service is
transferred across a technologically separable interface. One stage of activity ends and
another begins (Williamson, 1985). Transaction costs entail the transfer of resources,
either physically or legally.
In the enforcement of property rights, transaction costs play an important role.
Successful institutions can be characterized as those institutions where on the one hand
the rules and regulations are strongly embedded in the mind-set of the stakeholders in
order to keep the transaction costs linked to the enforcement to a minimum, while on the
other hand the institution offers a locally optimal solution to complex coordination issues
that without the institution would lead to insurmountable transaction costs in various
fields.
The rules and regulations governing the interactions between individuals and / or
groups where it concerns property are usually presented in terms of property rights.
However besides the notion of rights there are also obligations or duties concerning the
property. These duties can be placed along side the rights as the flip side of a coin. The
main difference however is that obligations are related primarily to the level above the
basic operational level.
This implies that we can now also distinguish the following duties:
1. Management duties: the obligation to regulate the internal pattern of usage and / or
the transformation of the resource in such a way that certain preconditions are
met, including basic notions about sustainability;
2. Exclusion duties: the obligation to exclude or grant rights to certain groups or
individuals under certain circumstances;
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3. Alienation duties: the obligation to pass on any of the other rights and / or duties to
another party under certain circumstances.
So we have only marginally into consideration that rights and may not be in hands of a
single stakeholder. Obviously with common pool resources, those exploiting the resource
are often individuals or households, while those managing the resource are communities.
In principal each right and / or duty can be attributed to one or more stakeholders. If there
are more stakeholders, there are grounds for conflict. If there is conflict there is a need for
means to mediate in the conflict, either in a formal (courts) or informal (village councils)
sense.
There is another issue that plays an important role when more than one stakeholder is
concerned. This is the issue of monitoring and control. A stakeholder may have certain
rights and obligations vis à vis other stakeholders, but if there are but limited possibilities
to have checks and balances in place the rights and obligations will have little meaning.
Extraction rights may be limited to a few selected stakeholders, but if there is no control
possible over “illegal” extraction, those extraction rights are of limited value especially if
rights are combined with restricting obligations that do not hold for those who extract
outside the framework of the property rights regime.
An important concept in relation to monitoring and control is that of transaction costs.
The transaction costs are the costs that have to be incurred to effectuate the monitoring
and control of the property rights regime. Very often failure of property rights regimes to
deliver the desired results regarding common pool resources can be attributed to high
transaction costs for monitoring and control when many stakeholders exist.
Transaction costs are very important in understanding institutional aspects of
economic behavior (Furubotn and Richter, 1997) since it relates not only to the issues of
monitoring and control, but also to the cost of information in general. When property
rights regimes are unclear, the costs of action and inaction can be very great.
Especially when poor households in affected rural communities depend critically on
the natural resources for their livelihoods, well-defined rules and regulations governing
the use of those natural resources, whether de facto or de jure, are indispensable. This is a
necessary but not sufficient precondition as we have just argued. It is also important to
have the means to enforce the rights and obligations related to the property rights regime
and to have a system for monitoring and control with transaction costs that are not
prohibitive.
Following the notions put forward by Williamson, we argue that lower transaction
costs in complex settings are associated with well-embedded institutions. Wellembedded institutions imply that stakeholders will be less willing to infract the rules, and
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other stakeholders will be more willing to monitor and control the adherence to the rules.
Strong customary law can be very instrumental.

2.2.

History of Swat

History matters for entitlements because it is at the root of the status quo and, as such, it
shapes expectations (claims and rights). The history of Swat has a bearing on current land
tenure and forest management. Historical developments are at the origin of the right
holding of heirs of the most important families allied to the local dictator. In this section
we will outline the historical evolution leading to the modern management regime.
Swat has a distinct history in relation to Pakistan and the rest of the Indian subcontinent. While the rest of the area was colonised by the British crown, Swat succeeded
in conserving its autonomy and, once Pakistan became independent in 1947, it did not
fully access Pakistan until 1969.1

2.2.1 Pre accession
The earlier history of Swat (from the end of the 19th century) was marked by the
emergence of a political structure centred on an autocrat. The dictator, called Wali, was
leading a rebellious country and needed the support of allies from the powerful families
of Swat in order to defend the Princely State of Swat (as the state was officially called
before the accession to Pakistan). Challenges to the state came from external powers (the
British and the neighbouring Kalam state) and from internal ones (other local leaders
trying to seize power) (Sultan-i-Rome, 2005). As a result, the rulers were under
continuous threat and built alliances with wealthy local lords.
The history of the Wali is especially important for the management of the forest,
because natural resources were valuable assets used for building and keeping alliances,
thus their exploitation was crucial to the survival of the regime. The management system
compounded harsh punishments to those who illegally encroached the forest, while
allowing favoritism and smuggling to the Wali’s –and his allies’– benefit. The decision
power, with respect to logging and forest exploitation, was centralised and rested in the
hands of the Wali. 2

1

For an account of Swat’s resistance to outsiders occupation and interference see Lindholm, 1990.
For a detailed historical account of the autocratic rule of the Wali of Swat, the strictness of the
application of the law to the commoners, the importance that forestry had under his rule, and the illegal
cutting and favours for his allies (the Khans) see Sultan-i-Rome, 2005. For an altogether different
version of the Wali’s rule see his autobiography (Barth, 1985).
2
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2.2.2 Post accession
The accession to Pakistan of the Princely State of Swat, brought a breakdown of the
existing institutional setting: the national state, formally, took under its control the
management and exploitation of forests. The law provided only for a minute
disbursement of royalties (10% of the total net revenues) to be paid to the legal right
holders and established some extraction rights for local communities (to meet
consumption needs of the residents).
Pakistani state’s management, from the moment it took over the forest sector in Swat,
was characterized by a command and control approach whose effective enforcement was
beyond state’s capability.3 The post accession regime implied that most of the forests
were declared reserved or protected, i.e. the management regimes strictly constrained
exploitation rights.4 In both systems property and management rested in the hands of the
state, through the Forest Department, but locals and former owners’ rights are different
under the two management regimes. In the reserve forest, no cutting is allowed and
members of the local community have limited rights for extracting dry wood and non
timber forest products. In protected forest, the Forest Department is in charge of the
management plan and at times when there are cuttings, the forest development
corporation is in charge of the cutting of marked timber and shares of the net sales
revenues are given to right holders (Steimann, 2004). Moreover, the “local quota” of
timber is reserved to local residents for their needs and there is an “emergency quota” that
can be used under special circumstances (e.g. to rebuild a house after a fire). 5
The shares of revenues from wood sales directed to right holders have been increasing
over time, from 10% at the time of accession, to 60% nowadays. Those entitled to shares
of the royalties of the forest are the land owners (mostly Khans families–the former allies
of the Wali) that reside far away from the forest, or local communities, depending on the
property situation of the forest at the time it was taken over by the state.6 The incapability
of the state to implement its policies, together with the dismantlement of the previous
regime of property rights, gave rise to an open access regime.
Additionally, the gap between de jure and de facto management of the forest created
multiple bases for claiming rights on the forest: the statutory law, custom, and the de
3

Pakistan was not the only state that tried to control the forest sector without the necessary resources to
implement its own rules on the face of high transaction costs. For comparison see Ostrom (1990) on
Nepal.
4
A third category of forests are the guzara forests. They are those whose property was left to the
communities, even though relevant management responsibilities were taken over by the Forest
Department. Guzara forest is an institutional setup that characterized almost no forest in our study area.
5
For a detailed description of legal status and management provisions in the forest of the whole of the
North West Frontier Province see Steimann, 2004.
6
Property rights over the forest are contested and contention over property rights is a source of endless
litigations that are dealt by Pakistan’s corrupt and inefficient judiciary system.
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facto regime. In such a situation, some agents chose to refer to competing legal structures
to justify their claims according to their interests and other agents preferred to operate
altogether outside of the legal framework (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002).
The open access regime on the forest implied that land owners and local residents
were exploiting the forest restrained only by local power relations. Since the Forest
Department started operations in Swat (along with the rest of the Pakistani public
administration), the gap between the regulatory framework and the actual management
practices was not bridged. Encroachments and illegal cuttings continued. Furthermore,
legal disputes over the cuttings’ royalties began and court decisions settling them were
long awaited (at times for decades), and, in many cases, court decisions are still pending.
With respect to the Forest Department, we collected information through focused
group discussions and interviews during the fieldwork. It appeared that corruption widely
affects all the operations of the Forest Department and of the Forest Development
Corporation (who is charge of exploitative operations). Forest guards are paid salaries
cannot satisfy the needs of families (Steimann, 2004) and they are lacking the support of
the other enforcement agencies (which are themselves inefficient and plagued by
corruption). The overall enforcement system seems more geared to make ends meet for
forest officials, rather than protect the forest. Also, the manning of numerous check-posts
along the roads going down the Swat Valley, serve little purpose apart from extracting
bribes in exchange for turning a blind eye on timber smugglers.7

2.3.

Transaction costs

Management and controlled extraction of products from natural resources not only
requires clearly defined property rights but also some system for monitoring and
evaluation of the state of the resource.
Within institutional economics measuring these indicators is classified under the term
transaction costs. In short, transaction costs include contact, contract & control (North,
1990, p28-33).
This entails the cost of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being managed.
This may be difficult, because of asymmetric information: resource managers on one side
of the market have much better information than those on the other side. Moreover there
are the costs of policing and enforcing agreements. Enforcement poses no problems when
it is in the interests of the other party to live up to agreements. But without institutional
constraints, self-interested behaviour will exclude complex exchange because of the
uncertainty that the other party will find it in his or her interest to live up to the

7

This was confirmed by numerous interviews and by our own witnessing the ease of movement of
truckloads of illegal logs in thorough the valley.
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agreement. This problem is particularly relevant for agreements in which there are
conflicting interests. Policing and enforcing agreements (or rules, laws etc) may involve
substantial costs.

3.

Forest Management in Swat

The present situation in Swat can be seen as the result of historic processes described
above. While the overall goal of the Forest Department and the local communities may
not differ that much: sustainable management of the forest resources to ensure a stable
stream of revenues and services, the outcome of the strategic actions of the actual
stakeholders is quite the opposite.
Let us start by disentangling the different stakeholders to then relate them to the
different aspects of the current property rights regimes. The main stakeholders are as can
be gathered from the historic perspective described above: the Forestry Department, the
local communities on the fringe of the forest, large land owners who are not themselves
part of the afore mentioned local communities, besides these main stakeholders there are
also those who have a vested interest in a steady supply of timber from the forests of
NWFP, often referred to as the Timber Mafia.
Extraction rights and obligations related to those rights are handled somewhat
differently under statutory and customary law. Under statutory law, the Forest
Department is the sole entity with extraction and management rights related to timber.
The ban on logging that has been in effect over the past decade or so, implies a very
strong restriction on extraction. Extraction rights are limited to local needs for
construction and firewood purposes. The Forestry Department has the duty to pay
royalties to the rightful stakeholders in the forest.
Under customary law, the owner of the forest has the disposal of the extraction
rights. He can lease out those rights to individual loggers. Under the rule of the Wali,
commercial logging did not take place on a large scale, and extraction was mainly for
domestic purposes. There was no royalty system.
Over time overall land tenure systems have changed. The traditional system of
rotating land ownership amongst large land owners with whole communities as tenants
has given way to a mixed system of large landholdings alongside small holdings of
individuals and communities. With the mixed system regarding agricultural land an
unclear situation regarding rights to forestry royalties has arisen. It is unclear to which
owners of agricultural land, certain forestry lots are related.
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3.1.

High transaction costs of sustainable forestry

Management of the forest resources used to be the domain of the local land owners
or their tenants. With state ownership of forest resources, management is the exclusive
domain of the Forestry Department. However monitoring and control of the forests and
the activities therein is costly and hence transgression of formal rules is usually not
punished.
What we need to keep in mind is that there are a number of conflicting goals and
aspirations of different stakeholders vis-à-vis the natural resource base. Where local
communities will often regard the forest as a source of revenues especially in the absence
of other sources of income, the state will often have a more general perspective by
viewing the forest as a continuing source of ecological service provision, in terms of
biodiversity, watershed management, etc. The benefits of these ecological services do not
accrue to the local communities but to beneficiaries elsewhere. Sustainable management
of forest resources implies that the conflicting goals are somehow resolved.
In order to ensure sustainable management of natural resources a number of criteria
have to be met that are not met in NWFP. The first is clear property rights, especially in
relation to the management of the forest resources. The second is the realisation that the
management costs and the benefits of the ecological services are not linked to the same
stakeholders. Some sort of compensation mechanism should be in place if non-benefiting
stakeholders are supposed to provide management inputs, see the growing literature on
Payments for Environmental Services. If management of the forest resources is not
effectuated through working economic instruments, the alternative is a system of
command and control. This entails the definition of clear indicators for management and a
costly system of monitoring. These costs are generally considered transaction costs of the
management scheme. Even under systems of communal management (with and without
outside payment) there are costly systems of monitoring necessary to ensure that the flow
of ecological services is safeguarded.
People facing moderate, credible environmental threats are more likely to be willing
manage the forest resources in a sustainable manner than those who do not face those
threats but just exercise those threats. This former group may need small economic
incentives to get involved in sustainable forest management, more so than those living in
relative harmony with nature. Although paying the latter may be perceived as ‘fair’, it
does not create additional ecological service provision. The transaction costs involved in
ensuring sustainable forest management increase with the decrease in felt environmental
threats.
Transaction costs for monitoring sustainable forest management also increase with
disarticulated organisational structures. If the organisational structures at local level are
not recognized by formal authorities or not taken seriously, it becomes difficult to set up a
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system of joint monitoring. Trust is an important element in transactions. With unclear
property rights the level of distrust between various stakeholders tends to be high.

3.2.

Corruption

Corruption plays an important role in illegal logging operations that take place across
Swat. The enforcement agencies (first of all, the Forest Department) whose official goal
is protecting the forest have in many occasions turned into the main culprits. In practice,
the main purpose of many agents that are supposed to watch over the management and
protection of the forest is to gain the maximum personal advantage from the power that
they hold. The extraction of personal gains through the exercise of public power is the
very definition of corruption (Transparency International, 2004) and in the enforcement
agencies of Swat it takes the shape of bribe extraction. Inducements are disbursed
throughout the illegal logging process: when logs are fell, and when they are transported.8
Forest guards patrolling the forest are generally ready to demand a bribe for turning a
blind eye on illegal activities.9 When agreement on illegal payments cannot be made,
possibly because of some incorruptible employees of the Forest Department,
confrontations among smugglers and forest guards can escalate into violence.10
Furthermore, forest officials artificially create occasions for bribes extraction because
they create bureaucratic obstacles to members of the local community who have a right to
extract wood for self-consumption (e.g. they delay the issue of extraction permits).
Indeed, some of the most common complaint of locals is that they are harassed when they
exercise their rights and when villagers are been involved in participatory projects they
required changes to the procedure for emitting logging permits (Suleri, 2002).
Corruption and the related enforcement problem in the forestry sector are well known
across the country and are often reported by the press.11 Reform attempts do recognise the
8

Information on corruption and forestry has been accumulated during the fieldwork. The source of
such information is, in most of the cases, are group interviews with members of the local communities,
with students of history, lawyers, and employees of the Forest Department (of different ranks).
9
The situation of bribes extraction is not as clear-cut as it could seem at first. Forest guards themselves
are not aware of the rules that should be applied if someone is caught breaching the law. In such a
confused situation the difference between a bribe and a fine (whose proceeds are used to complement a
meagre salary) becomes blurred. Steimann (Steimann, 2004) illustrates different perceptions -within
the Forest Department- of the de jure management regime with respect to enforcement.
10
Honest forest officials are reported to be the victims of violence, but given the fact that there are
discordant reports it is difficult to say a final word on who the victim or the assailant in these
confrontations.
11
For a few examples see October 17, 2003 of Dawn (internet edition) at
www.dawn.com/2003/10/17/nat28.htm.

14
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2008

15

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 201 [2008]

shortcoming of the present management regime and suggest changes to the enforcement
mechanisms. These reform attempts are often focused on increasing the likelihood of
catching those involved in illegal activities and increasing the penalties (‘crime and
punishment’ approach), or require radical reforms at the state level. The crime and
punishment approach focuses on the improving the enforcement of existing legal
arrangements. The problem with this approach is that it requires that the control agencies
are not corrupt, while in Pakistan the judiciary and the police (that is those who should
coerce forest official to respect the law and resist the temptation of colluding with illegal
loggers) are very corrupted agencies themselves (Transparency International, 2002). Thus
the controller cannot be relied upon. National reforms such as the ones that are requested
by international NGOs that focus on fighting corruption, require major changes in the
institutional framework and meet the opposition of powerful vested interests. The
transition away from a status where corruption is so pervasive need to be embedded in
other interests in order to be successful and the use of textbook rules for achieving such
transition is commonly resulting in a failure (Johnston, 2005). This is witnessed by the
fact that only seldom countries do manage to sensibly decrease the amount of corruption
they are affected in a short period of time (Kaufmann, Kraay et al., 2005). While radical
reforms like introducing guarantees for free mass-medias, democratising the political
process, encourage citizens scrutiny of politicians are initiatives that deserve
encouragement and are valuable objectives (per se, beyond their implications for
corruption), their achievement in the short run seems unlikely and improving
management in the forestry sector cannot wait for ideal conditions.
Moreover the successful enforcement of existing property rights, even if possible,
would run the risk of cementing historical injustices: above we highlighted the origins of
skewed rights distribution towards large land owners. Historical developments with

respect to land holdings are still determining skewed land distribution since land
reforms’ implementation failed (see Naqvi, Khan et al., 1987 and Social Policy and
Development Centre (SPDC), 2001). The effective enforcement of rules based on existing
rights would deprive members of the local communities of large shares of their income
and, ultimately, of their necessary means of survival.12
Finally, reforms that focus on enforcement end up giving increasing power to forest
officials. When confronted with opportunities to extract bribes, these officials are
predictably going to use their powers to increase their share of rents. Forest officials
would find that the easiest way to extract rents is using their increased powers against
12

The poor, especially those living in the more marginal areas, depend on resources that would not be
available to them if the law would be successfully enforced(Rafi Khan, Yusuf et al., 2006). In
particular, such decrease on the availability of resources would be problematic if –as it seems most
probable- the interpretation of the law and the resolution of disputes on property rights would be biased
in favour of large land owners.
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those agents that are not in the condition to resist. As a result the most corrupt members
of the Forest Department are most likely going to increase their revenues at the expense
of villagers who are in trouble with meeting their own basic needs.

3.3.

Vested interests

Economic agents coordinate themselves in order to take advantage of profit opportunities
offered by the existing institutional setting. Over time, the selection of successful
organizations will create wealthy interests who have a stake in the same institutions that
allowed them to operate and enrich (North, 1990). In the forest sector of Swat the
opportunities offered by the open access situation, following the breakdown of earlier
institutions that characterised accession to Pakistan, were seized by a constellation of
economic agents and gave raise to a new de facto institutional setting. Those who have
gained the most from these institutions have large stakes in the status quo and have the
resources to defend these interests. In this section we will identify the stakeholders in the
management of forests in Swat and highlight the vested interests that need to be tackled in
order to achieve institutional reform.
The main actors, with stakes in the forestry sector, are: federal and provincial
governments, the Forest Department, the forest development corporation, local
communities (differentiated among themselves mostly because of right-holding issues),
NGOs, and international donors who all have some qualified interest in forest
conservation. Additionally, there are the interests involved in illegal logging for
commercial purposes (the timber mafia), since the forest has been put under such strain
by over-extraction that in the medium run only logging for local consumption would be
possible. These agents -thanks to corruption- are able to unduly influence some of the
other actors.
The vested interests that will resist most changes from the current situation are those
that profit from illegal logging. These include the smugglers, the wood processing
industry, and the economic agents involved in activities induced by timber trade. All of
these actors depend -to a different degree- on the continuation of unsustainable logs
extraction.
The Forest Department, though not in its entirety, is among the vested interests
opposed to change. The current regime is giving to the Forest Department demanding
tasks (beyond feasible reach), but also granting it political and economic power. Some
members of the Forest Department, at different levels from the top to the ground, have
become accustomed to receiving bribes to complement their meagre salaries. These
illegal disbursement are dependent on the power that the department can wield. Apart
from the economic incentives related to bribes it also appears that the Department
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developed its own routines and it is unwilling to give up part of its responsibilities even
though it lacks the resources to fulfil the tasks related to them.13
The provincial government is the recipient of 40% of royalties on commercial logging
and, more importantly, members of it are also collecting bribes in relation to illegal
extraction, or are linked to the illegal logging industry. The reluctance of the provincial
government to give away the power on and part of the revenues from the forestry sector
were –as we will see- some of the main reasons for the failure of previous reform
attempts aiming at introducing participatory forestry in Swat.
The current institutional regime is embedded in these interests and successful reform
can be achieved only when the reform process will be equally embedded in a coalition of
potential winners. Furthermore, once institutional change is in order, the resistance to
change of vested interests can be diluted by external resources. Such resources could be
used for creating a win-win solution for insiders.

3.4.

Reform attempts: from the Forest Sector Policy initiative to
the latest developments

The unsustainability of de facto management practices and the environmental, social, and
economic shortcomings of current deforestation rates in most of the NWFP is apparent
and some steps have been undertaken in order to reform the forestry sector. For the Swat
district the most relevant reform effort was the Forest Sector Strategy, whose incept was
supported by a loan of the Asian Development Bank and by technical assistance to the
program provided by the Dutch Royal Embassy.
The main task of this donor-driven program was to move the management of the forest
from a state of command and control (and the related coercive practices and the social
outcome thereof) towards co-management. In the intentions of the donors, the reform
would have strengthened the local capabilities and the emphasis of the operations of the
Forest Department, with respect to local communities, would have moved from
punishment towards partnership.
The process is characterized by contradicting steps. On the one hand, local
committees14 have been established in several villages, so that they could be an
interlocutor of the Forest Department and, most importantly, contribute to the village land
use plan. On the other hand, the process seems to have been controlled at the local level
by the most influential members of the community (so that the committees over-represent
the wealthy) and the Forest Department has been unwilling to give up part of its powers
13

The widespread of this attitude was confirmed by more progressive members of the Forest
Department in several meetings.
14
The committees are the Village Development Committee (composed by men) and the Women
Organization (composed by women).
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and enter in a real partnership with the locals. Eventually, due to implementation
slowness and especially because of the resistance at the provincial level to undertake the
necessary steps to support the reform in due time, the support of donor agencies have
been withdrawn in 2004. This was a mayor setback, especially in the few places where
the reform started to yield benefits (see Suleri, 2002). Now trust in this type of
interventions is lost and it will be even more difficult for new projects to build
confidence.
The Forest Ordinance of 2002 confirmed that the reform process was proceeding in
contradicting ways. The incept of the ordinance was admirable -geared towards setting
co-management and partnership in a stable regulatory framework-, but under the
insistence of more conservative powers in the Forest Department the final result was only
a compromise. Even Sungi, a Pakistani grass root NGO working for the empowerment of
the most marginal members of the society, which from the beginning was supportive of
the reform process, eventually rejected the Forest Ordinance. Of special importance in
determining Sungi’s stance were the punitive powers that the ordinance gave to the Forest
Department and that can be used against local communities.
Since the donors’ support to the reform process was stopped, the whole process halted.
The latest development were, if needed, and additional proof of the resistance that there
was to the reform process. The latest initiatives are towards the strengthening of the
Forest Department control of the forest and -in accordance to the 2002 Forest Ordinancethe forest force has been instituted.15 Now a 500 men-strong armed force will patrol the
forest of the North West Frontier Province. The Forest Department itself estimates that at
least 3000 would be required in order to patrol effectively the forest of the province.16 It
appears that the insufficient number of men involved in the force will be in the future an
excuse for another failure of the ‘crime and punishment’ approach.
It is also worth noting that if the existing force would be effective much less than 500
armed men would be necessary in order to control extraction activities in the area. Few
roads run along the valley and functioning check-posts should be sufficient to stop a large
part of the smuggling. If the guards manning the check posts are colluding with the
smugglers, is arming the very same guards going to help to halt deforestation? Is having
armed guards patrolling the forest, even more removed from detection possibility, going
to stop illegal cuttings? Such questions should be addressed if the resources devoted to
the reform process have to produce the intended environmental, economic and social
dividend.

15

See http://www.ttjonline.com/story.asp?sc=35057, retrieved on the 01/08/2005.
The expected cost of equipping such a force would be of 60m Pakistani Rupees (or around 825,000
euros). See http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/16/local23.htm
16
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3.5.

Virtuous examples of forest management

So far we have depicted a very grim image of the forestry sector of North West
Pakistan with rampant deforestation due to unclear property rights and obligations and
very few means to enforce them. However there are a few isolated examples of
initiatives that rein in deforestation. These examples do shed a light on the way
property rights regimes at a local level can be used for sustainable forest management.
Local groups of citizens at various times have been organizing themselves in
order to defend some stretches of forest from exploitation. The most effective way
that has been found to enforce extraction restrictions was with limits on the transport
of logs: community-manned check posts have been set-up and timber loads have been
blocked along the roads (Killeen and Khan, 2001; Rafi Khan, Bokhari et al., 2004).
These check posts are operated independently from the Forestry department’s check
posts (Rafi Khan, Bokhari et al., 2005) which is a clear indication of the level of
mistrust between local communities and the state organisations.
Other efforts to protect the forest involved local communities in concert with the forest
department. The ones that were initiated under the donor-sponsored initiatives include
community manned check posts, patrols from the local community guarding the forests,
join patrols of community and forest department members and have been associated with
improvements in forest cover (Steimann, 2004; Suleri, 2002).

In NWFP a forest sector reform was initiated with the help of the Asian
Development Bank and bilateral foreign donors (mainly the Dutch). As part of this
initiative people belonging to the forested areas of NWFP set up a platform, named
Sarhad Awami Forestry Ittehad (SAFI) to raise their voice to make the process of
reforms more democratic, transparent and people friendly. Although there is a voiced
opposition to the way the forestry reform is progressing which is not promising for
joint management by state and local communities, there is at least the beginning of
focussed organisation (SAFI, 2002).
Donor funded pilot projects of community managed forests in neighbouring Dir
District, were quite promising for a while but have encountered severe difficulties
after funding stopped. Joint forest management seems to have scope for success but
depends critically on the willingness to endorse such a process by the Forestry
Department (Sungi, 1996).

4.

Conclusions
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Institutional change is costly. Let us examine two types of institutional change. The
first type is institutional change that originates from within the confines of the
stakeholder group that adheres to the original institutional arrangement. The second is
institutional change that is enforced on stakeholders by an “overlord”. Obviously
actual institutional change takes place on a spectrum between the two extremes.
Institutional change that originates from within can be characterized as an
adaptation to changing circumstances. The changing circumstances can be
autonomous processes, such as population growth (demographic pressure), integration
into the outside world (market access), changes in the resource base (agro-ecological
potential) and the knowledge base (technological innovation). If the change in
circumstances facing the decision-makers is gradual, then institutions can evolve
alongside in order to deal with the new situations. Information is costly; hence
institutional change from within reflects the trial-and-error adaptation and may well
not coincide with the theoretically most efficient solution. However, institutions that
evolve from within tend to be robust.
Costs associated with collective action tend to be lower if groups are small
(Olson, 1965) and homogenous (Baland and Platteau, 1997; 1998). This implies that
small special interest groups have disproportionate power compared to large
amorphous groups.
Institutional change that originates from outside the original stakeholder
confines, may depart from traditional rules in order to address issues that local
institutions cannot deal with because the changing outside circumstances have
become too overwhelming. The solutions offered by this exogenous institutional
change may be theoretically more efficient (especially in the long-run), however the
institutions are less (or even not) embedded in the local communities, which implies
that the enforcement costs of the institutional arrangements can become very high.
When the institutional arrangements are not firmly embedded in the local
community the principal stakeholder implementing the institutional arrangements is
faced with a series of managerial and political transaction costs. These include costs
for setting up, maintaining or changing the organizational design; costs (information,
physical transfer) of running the organization; the costs of running the polity.
In summary we can say that in circumstances where institutional change is
necessary we are faced with a trade-off between the transaction costs related to the
enforcement of “improved” institutional arrangements and the transaction costs
improving enforceable institutional arrangements. Incurring these transaction costs
only makes sense if the benefits from improved institutional arrangements outweigh
the transition costs.
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When we relate this dilemma to the management regime of the forest in Swat,
we identify at the one end of the spectrum the ideal forest management system; at the
other end we see the spontaneous evolution of self organization. Different
stakeholders in Swat have their own ideal management system to put forward. This is
private property rights for the local large landowners. Alternatively, state ownership
(effectively enforced by the Forest eDpartment) can be identified as the goal of the
government, and by the Forest Department. The management by local communities
(guaranteeing socially and environmentally sustainable outcomes) as common pool
resources is identified by the local communities characterised by higher level of trust
and most NGOs and donors.17 Obviously the division of ideal management regimes
will not relate so clearly to each class of actors; most notably the most progressive
elements of the Forest Department will also identify community based management
as an ideal. The current situation is an in between with an incoherent set of external
interventions and strategic reactions by different agents in the local communities. The
emergent system of management is the one producing the present dismal outcome.
The role of donors and external interventions, in order to be effective, should not
go on the opposite direction with respect to embedded evolutionary processes. The
role of these interventions could be complementary to local process and contribute to
guarantee that their evolution will respect social and environmental objectives. In this
perspective, external actors could provide the additional founds so to orient locally
evolved institutional change can produce desired outcomes (low transaction costs,
equity and sustainable management of the natural resource base) and providing
incentives so that no spoilers’ coalition arises in order to stop the process. In this
framework, external agencies would be directing some of the final goals, but leaving
the organizational issues to local actors who can behave according to their preferential
knowledge and produce locally embedded institutional change.
Joint forest management seems to have possibilities given the scattered positive
signals highlighted earlier. However we argue that the preconditions in terms of welldefined institutional arrangements regarding property rights, control and financial
remuneration for management activities should be addressed prior to embracing any
scheme that is considered some sort of silver-bullet.
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